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Introduction
The Visual Artists Rights Act (VARA) of 1990 amends the copy-
right laws of the United States (U.S.)' to protect the rights of visual art-
ists. This legislation brought the U.S. into compliance with an important
international copyright treaty, the Berne Convention,2 by granting moral
rights which were previously not recognized by any legal doctrine in
American law. The VARA created equality among artists in different
states, nations, and disciplines. Although subject to minor shortcomings,
the VARA demonstrates a commitment to the arts in this country by
protecting the rights of artists.
I
Introduction to the VARA
In 1986, two Australian entrepreneurs bought a Picasso drawing en-
titled "Trois Femmes" for $10,000. They cut the drawing into 500 one-
inch square sections and sold each of the squares for $135 as an original
Picasso. The enterprise went so well that one of the entrepreneurs re-
marked that the works of other masters would be purchased.'
In 1968, William Smith painted a mural on a wall of the Maryland
House, a historical monument in that state. Eighteen years later, Marri-
ott Hotels purchased a concession stand in the building and hired an
artist to paint over portions of the mural. When Smith found out about
the completed changes, he considered his work desecrated. It had been:
an appraisal put the value of the altered work at $70,000; the work had
been worth $500,000 in its original state.' Smith's signature still re-
mained on the work.'
Kenneth Snelson spent two years creating a sculpture for the New
York World's Fair in 1964, his first important public showing. After the
Fair, the purchaser of his sculpture, a scrap metal dealer, contacted
Snelson to ask about the alloy used in the chunks of scrap which re-
mained from Snelson's award winning work.6
1. Visual Artists Rights Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-650, 104 Stat. 5128 (codified as
amended in scattered sections of 17 U.S.C.) (hereinafter VARA].
2. Berne Convention Implementation Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-568, 102 Stat. 2853
(codified at 17 U.S.C. §§ 101, 104, 116, 116A, 205, 301, 401-408, 411, 501, 801, 804) (1988).
3. Charles Ossola, Law for Art's Sake, LEGAL TIMES, Dec. 10, 1990, at 27; Michael
Kernan, The Great Debate Over Artist's Rights; Facing the Tough Question of Who Really
Controls a Work of Art, WASH. POST, May 22, 1988, at Fl.
4. Kernan, supra note 3, at Fl.
5. Ossola, supra note 3, at 27.
6. Laura Van Tuyl, Do Not Fold, Mutilate, or Trash, CHRISTIAN SCi. MONITOR, Dec.
24, 1990, at 10.
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Until recently, none of the above artists had any legal redress in this
country. However, on December 1, 1990, President Bush signed legisla-
tion that included the VARA.7
The issue of artists' rights is not new. In the past, Congress consid-
ered measures to protect artists' interests.I Senator Edward Kennedy in-
troduced the VARA legislation several years ago, but it was rejected by
the Senate Committee on the Judiciary.9 Indeed, this law may owe its
very existence to the chicanery of the veteran Senator because Kennedy
"quietly inserted" the VARA into the omnibus legislation enacted at the
close of the 101st Congress."0 George C. Smith, Chief Minority Coun-
sel for the Senate Judiciary Committee on Technology and the Law,
called the passage of the VARA "Christmas tree" legislation." He com-
mented that the measure passed "only because of its linkage ... without
so much as a word of debate or discussion." 12'
The new legislation extends the rights of a small class of visual art-
ists. Those works covered include paintings, sculptures, lithograph
prints in editions numbering 200 or less, and photographs taken for exhi-
bition purposes only.'"
The VARA extends the copyright laws to include "moral rights" of
artists. Moral rights originated in France's "droit moral,"' 4 which in-
cluded the following: (1) the right to create a work; (2) the right to pub-
lish a work; (3) the right to withdraw a published work from sale; (4) the
right to prevent excessive criticism; (5) the right to prevent other viola-
tion of reputation; (6) the right of paternity; and (7) the right of integ-
rity.15 Save the latter two, these rights have been limited or repealed in
7. VARA, supra note 1, at 5089.
8. Martin A. Roeder, Note, The Doctrine of Moral Right: A Study in the Law of Artists,
Authors, and Creators, 53 HARV. L. REV. 554, 557 (1940). The article cites the following
proposed legislation for the adoption of the Berne Convention which would have granted
moral rights to artists: S. 1928, H.R. 5853, 73d Cong., 1st Sess. (1933); S. 3047, 74th Cong.,
1st Sess. (1935); H.R. 10,632, 74th Cong., 2d Sess. (1936).
9. Kennedy introduced the bill on August 6, 1987. S. 1619, 100th Cong., 1st Sess., 133
CONG. REC. 11,471-503 (1987). According to the history of the Senate bill in the Congres-
sional Record, it has not cleared the Senate Committee on the Judiciary. It seems that it was
slipped into the signed legislation.
10. Eric Felten, New Law Gives Rights to Artist After Work is Sold, WASH. TIMES, Nov.
28, 1990, at El.
11. George C. Smith, Artistic License Takes on a New Meaning, LEGAL TIMES, Dec. 17,
1990, at 23.
12. Id.
13. VARA, supra note 1, at 5128.
14. Comment, Toward Artistic Integrity: Implementing Moral Right Through Extension of
Existing American Legal Doctrines, 60 GEO. L.J. 1539, 1540 (1972). Directly translated,
"droit morale" means moral right.
15. Id. at 1540 n.5.
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French law.16 The VARA grants only the right of paternity and the right
of integrity 17 to artists of "recognized stature."' 8
The right of paternity recognizes that an author should be identified
as the creator of a work.I9 This right prevents the erroneous attribution
of a work to another artist. The right of paternity also allows an author
to deny authorship. For example, if an author feels that a work no
longer reflects the author's artistic vision, then the author may prevent
association of her name with the work.2 ° The right of integrity recog-
nizes that an author should be empowered to prevent alterations or muti-
lations of a work. Under the VARA, an artist may prevent the
mutilation, alteration or destruction of the work even when it is sold to
another party.21 An artist may enjoin the destruction or mutilation if the
change would "be prejudicial to his or her honor or reputation. '22
By granting the moral rights of paternity and integrity, Congress
recognized that works of art are fundamentally different from other com-
modities, and that special protections should apply. Moral rights protect
the link between the artist and the artwork by guaranteeing that an artist
will only be associated with works which represent the creator's artistic
vision.
II
The Berne Convention: Adherence at Last
In 1988, the U.S. adopted the Berne Convention for the Prolifera-
tion of Literature and Art.23 This reciprocal copyright treaty protects
the works of authors internationally by allowing the copyrights of indi-
viduals in one member country to be recognized by all member countries.
One provision specifically requires that each signatory recognize the
moral rights of its authors.24 Although the U.S. was a member of the
Berne Convention, moral rights of authors were not recognized prior to
the passage of the VARA.
16. Id. at 1540.
17.. VARA, supra note 1, at 5128.
18. Id. at 5129.
,19. Comment, supra note 14, at 1540-41.
20. Id.
21. VARA, supra note 1, at 5128.
22. Id. at 5129.
23. Berne Convention Implementation Act of 1988, supra note 2.
24. Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works (Berne Conven-
tion],. Sept. 9, 1886, completed at Paris, 1896, revised at Berlin, Nov. 13, 1908, completed at
Berne, Mar. 20, 1914, revised at Rome, June 2, 1928, revised at Brussels, June 26, 1948, re-
vised at Stockholm, July 14, 1967, revised at Paris, July 24, 1971, reprinted in 1971 COPY-
RIGHT 135 and in U.N. EDUC., ScI., & CULTURAL ORG. & WORLD INTELL. PROP. ORG.,
COPYRIGHT LAWS & TREATIES OF THE WORLD (Supp. 1972), art. 6 bis.
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Article 6 bis of the Berne Convention protects the moral rights of
artists:
(I) Independently of the patrimonial rights of the author, and even
after the assignment of said rights, the author retains the right to claim
the paternity of the work, as well as the right to object to every defor-
mation, mutilation or other modification of the said work, which may
be prejudicial to his honor or to his reputation.
(II) It is left to the national legislation of each of the countries of the
Union to establish the conditions for the exercise of these rights. The
means for safeguarding them shall be regulated by the legislation of the
country whose protection is claimed.25
By its membership in the Berne Convention, the U.S. ostensibly recog-
nized moral rights. However, Congress refused to create moral rights
legislation, 26 theorizing that U.S. law already protected the rights enu-
merated in the treaty through actions in defamation, privacy, unfair com-
petition, copyright, and contract.
On previous occasions, Congress declined to join the Berne Conven-
tion.27 Historically, large exploiters of creative works were opposed to
extending the rights of artists through participation in the Berne Conven-
tion.28  Recently, however, the dramatic increase in copyright piracy
made the international protection provided by the Berne Convention at-
tractive. One expert estimated the lost revenue from pirated works sold
in foreign countries at $500 million annually.29 Perhaps influenced by
the specter of continuing losses from piracy, one exploiter of creative
works, the Motion Picture Association of America (MPAA), supportfd
joining the Berne Convention. a° The MPAA was wary, however, of in;
cluding moral rights as part of the adoption of the Berne Convention. 31
The position of the MPAA was that the moral rights legislation was un-
necessary. Commentators and recent testimony at the Senate Judiciary
Subcommittee on Patents, Copyright, and Trademark hearings regarding
adoption of the Berne Convention suggest that the MPAA opposes moral
rights because they would reduce their control over films. 3 2 Granting
25. Id.
26. Berne Convention Implementation Act of 1988, supra note 2.
27. Roeder, supra note 8, at 558.
28. Id. The MPAA represents major film studios which own and market films. Roeder
noted the opposition of the motion picture producers and broadcasters to proposed legislation
to join the Berne Convention. Id.
29. Copyrights, Senate Subcommittee Hears Views on Berne Adherence Legislation, DAILY
REP. FOR EXECUTIVES, Mar. 4, 1988, (Regulation, Economics and Law), at 43. The article
quotes David Brown, representative for the Motion Picture Association of America. Figures
may be inflated because of Mr. Brown's advocacy, but presumably include only revenues lost
from television and film piracy.
30. Id.
31. Id.
32. Id.
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moral rights would transfer control of films from the studios, which own
the rights to the films, to the directors, who create the films.
33
Commentators have expressed the view that international organiza-
tions did not oppose U.S. accession to the Berne Convention because of
the importance of U.S. membership. 34 It is possible that the other mem-
bers were willing to overlook the shortcomings of U.S. law in order to
have the copyright interests in their works protected in the U.S.
Some members of Congress had trouble accepting the benefit of in-
ternational copyright protection offered by the Berne Convention while
simultaneously ignoring the duty to recognize moral rights domestically.
Representative Howard L. Berman (D-Cal.), for example, stated, "I am
troubled... that we may not be intellectually honest when we conclude
that we can join Berne by deeming U.S. laws to be in compliance, but
assuming none of the responsibilities under the Convention to enhance
the rights of authors."3
Other scholars have observed that these same moral rights should
have been guaranteed by U.S. adoption of the Universal Declaration of
Human Rights.36 Article 22 of that document guarantees that every per-
son is "entitled to realization .... and free development of his personal-
ity."' 37 Article 27, paragraph 2, of the Universal Declaration of Human
Rights also protects artists' moral rights by providing that, "[e]veryone
has the right to the protection of the moral and material interests result-
ing from any scientific, literary or artistic protection of which he is the
author.
38
Prior to the passage of the VARA, the U.S. agreed to protect moral
rights through its acceptance of the Berne Convention and the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights. By signing these international treaties
without protecting the moral rights of authors, the U.S. adopted incon-
sistent law.
33. See infra, notes 104-15 and accompanying text.
34. Copyrights, Senate Judiciary Committee Hears Debate on Visual Artists Moral Rights
Bill, DAILY REP. FOR EXECUTIVES, June 26, 1989, (Regulation, Economics and Law), at 121
(referring to the view of Edward Damich, Professor of Law, George Mason University).
35. Monroe E. Price, Now Playing: Colorization Bill, NAT'L L.J., July 18, 1988, at 13.
36. Dan Rosen, Artists' Moral Rights: A European Evolution, An American Revolution, 2
CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 155, 178 (1983).
37. Id. (quoting 217 U.N. GAOR at 75, U.N. Doe. A/810 (1948)).
38. Id. (quoting 217 U.N. GAOR at 76, U.N. Doe. A/810 (1948)).
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III
The VARA Provides Protection Where Existing Law
Fails
In joining the Berne Convention without extending the rights of au-
thors, Congress believed that moral rights were already protected under
existing U.S. law.39 The law of copyright," the doctrine of waste,4" def-
amation,42 unfair competition,43 contract law," and invasion of privacy45
have each been used to enhance the argument that moral rights legisla-
tion is not needed. These alternative legal theories fall short of the pro-
tection granted by the VARA. Only the VARA adequately protects
moral rights.
A. Copyright
Traditionally, the law of copyright protected only the pecuniary in-
terests of the creator.46 If this interest was assigned or waived, the artist
had no other remedy under copyright law. Only the holder of the copy-
right could protect the pecuniary interest. One court held that "Ameri-
can copyright law, as presently written, does not recognize moral rights
or provide a cause of action for their violation, since the law seeks to
vindicate the economic rather than the personal rights of authors."4
Copyright fails to adequately protect moral rights because copyright pro-
tection does not exist once the work is sold.
B. Doctrine of Waste
One commentator has proposed applying the property doctrine of
waste to copyright law in order to insure that the work is not changed,
mutilated, or destroyed.48 The artist, as grantor of the copyright, would
retain a reversionary interest in the copyright until it was renewed.
Therefore, if the holder of the copyright during those years altered or
39. Berne Convention Implementation Act of 1988, supra note 2.
40. Copyrights, Senate Judiciary Committee Hears Debate on Visual Artists Moral Rights
Bill, supra note 29, at 121.
41. Comment, supra note 14, at 1553.
42. Roeder, supra note 8, at 566.
43. Comment, supra note 14, at 1540-41.
44. Spielberg's Lament; Berne Convention Copyright Changes, NEW REPUBLIC, Mar. 21,
1988, at 7.
45. Samuel D. Warren and Louis D. Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REV. 193
(1890).
46. Gilliam v. ABC, 538 F.2d 14, 24 (2d Cir. 1976).
47. Id.
48. Comment, supra note 14, at 1551-54.
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destroyed the work, he would be liable to the original grantor because the
changes interfered with the reversioner's right of enjoyment.49
This theory, however, would not protect the artists' rights. The
1976 revision to the Copyright Act gave the holder an interest to extend
fifty years after death.5 ° Even under former law, which gave a renewable
twenty-eight-year right,I the original grantor did not necessarily retain a
reversion, because the law required that the grantor file a registration. 52
A legal reversion only occurs when the property right revests with the
original owner automatically, with no action required by the rever-
sioner." The registration requirement, therefore, might eliminate any re-
versionary interest which the grantor possessed. 4 And even if such a
requirement were ignored, the creator would be forced to wait until the
first twenty-eight-year period expired before an action could be filed.
Thus, the artist would have had no remedy because the "delaying of the
moral right amounts to denial of it."55
C. Defamation
An action for defamation may be sustainable if the alteration or mu-
tilation of the work damages the author's reputation by allowing others
to attribute the changed work to him.56 "To deform his work is to pres-
ent him to the public as the creator of a work not his own, and thus make
him subject to criticism for work he has not done..., Upon a cursory
examination, then, defamation protects the same interests protected by
moral rights: the author's interest in being identified with his work.
There are problems, however, with guaranteeing moral rights
through defamation. First, defamation law does not protect one aspect
of moral rights, the right to develop a reputation. Although the courts
have long recognized a legal interest in a reputation," no action for defa-
mation can stand if there is no existing reputation to be harmed.5 9
49. Id. at 1552-53.
50. 17 U.S.C. § 302(a)(1988).
51. 17 U.S.C. § 24 (repealed Jan. 1, 1976). "Former law" refers to the Copyright Act of
1909, which was revised dramatically in 1976. Copyright Act, Ch. 320, 35 Stat. 1075
(1909)(repealed Jan. 1, 1976).
52. 17 U.S.C. § 24 (repealed 1976).
53. ROGER CUNNINGHAM ET AL., THE LAW OF PROPERTY 96 (1984). "The rever-
sioner's right to possession accrues automatically, without the necessity of making an entry,
bringing an action for possession, or giving notice of termination." Id.
54. Comment, supra note 14, at 1558.
55. Id.
56. Id. at 1548.
57. Roeder, supra note 8, at 569.
58. See, e.g., Wood v. Lucy, Lady Duff-Gordon, 118 N.E. 214 (N.Y. 1917) (holding that
the reputation of a clothes designer was worthy of legal protection).
59. Comment, supra note 14, at 1550.
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Second, defamation could only prevent changes to a work, and not
the complete destruction of the work. No damage to the artist's reputa-
tion occurs if the work is destroyed and never shown." Third, a defama-
tion action only survives for as long as the creator lives; there is no action
for defamation post mortem.61 Finally, under a defamation theory, there
would be no way to prevent the damage except by threat of a lawsuit, as
injunctive relief is not generally granted under the law of defamation.62
D. Unfair Competition
An action for unfair competition may lie if another person tried to
pass off the author's work as his own, or if the work was created by
altering the work of the original author.63 This action, however, like
copyright protection, only protects the author's pecuniary interest." It
does not, for example, allow the author to recover damages for emotional
distress caused by the desecration of his work. Further, if the pecuniary
interest is assigned, then only the assignee, not the author, is protected.65
Thus, the creator may not have standing for an action in unfair
competition.
E. Freedom to Contract
The freedom to contract offers the broadest argument for the notion
that United States law affords the equivalent of moral rights protection.
Parties who want to protect the moral rights of an artist could include
such provisions in a contract. However, this argument is flawed. First,
an unequal bargaining position often prevents the artist from securing
moral rights in a contract. Second, the courts have been reluctant to
enforce such provisions even if an artist does bargain for them.
Many artists are not able to contract for their moral rights because
they have little bargaining power.66 Courts have recognized that the rel-
ative bargaining position of the parties may affect the validity of the con-
60. Roeder, supra note 8, at 569.
61. Id. at 567.
62. Comment, supra note 14, at 1555.
63. Id at 1541 n.9 (quoting Fisher v. Star Co., 132 N.E. 133, 139 (N.Y. App. Div.), cert.
denied, 257 U.S. 654 (1921)).
64. Roeder, supra note 8, at 567.
65. Id.
66. Bruce Fein, Illusory Guaranteefor Artistic Rights, WASH. TIMES, Dec. 4, 1990, at GI
(small time artists waive rights because they have no bargaining power); Neil F. Siegel, The
Resale Royalty Provisions of the Visual Artists' Rights Act: Their History and Theory, 93 DICK.
L. REV. 1, 2 n.8 (1988) (artists lack bargaining power).
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tract.67 Because the artist is usually in the weaker bargaining position,
she cannot reasonably expect to secure a provision protecting her moral
rights.6 In addition, at the time the contract is formed, the work is usu-
ally undervalued because the artist's avant garde visions have not yet
gained popular appeal. 69 Even if the work does depreciate after its sale,
as is common, 70 the artist still has the inferior bargaining position be-
cause at the time of the contract, the "value" of the work is
unascertainable.71
Surprisingly, the courts have denied protection to authors who are
able to contract for their moral rights. In Vargas v. Esquire, Inc.,72 the
court implied a waiver of the right of paternity by the plaintiff. The
plaintiff, Vargas, had drawn a sketch for Esquire magazine entitled, "The
Varga Girl." The magazine printed the sketch with the name "The Es-
quire Girl," and without the author's signature or any other identifying
marks. Despite Vargas' assumption that the work would be attributed to
him, the contract was silent on the issue of placement of Vargas' name on
the work. 7a The Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals found that absent an
express provision, the plaintiff had waived his right to paternity.74
In Preminger v. Columbia Picture Corp.,75 the contract provided
that the filmmaker was to have "the right to make the final cutting and
editing of the picture." The filmmaker sued when Columbia edited his
film, "Anatomy of a Murder," for television without his permission.76
The court denied the plaintiff any recovery, holding that the terms "final
cutting" and "editing" only applied to the theater version, and that the
television rights were entirely separate.77 The court thus refused to en-
force the terms dealing with moral rights, even though they were in-
cluded within the contract.78
67. See, e.g., Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, 161 A.2d 69 (N.J. 1960) (finding that the
much stronger financial position of the auto dealer relative to the auto buyer amounted to a
lack of choice in accepting the waivers included in a service agreement).
68. Fein, supra note 66, at G1.
69. Siegel, supra note 66, at 8.
70. Id. at 9.
71. Comment, supra note 14, at 1560.
72. 164 F.2d 522 (7th Cir. 1947), cert. denied, 335 U.S. 813 (1948).
73. 164 F.2d at 525-26.
74. Id. at 526.
75. 267 N.Y.S.2d 594 (Sup. Ct.), aff'd, 269 N.Y.S.2d 913 (App. Div.), aff'd, 219 N.E.2d
431 (N.Y. 1966).
76. 267 N.Y.S.2d at 596.
77. Id. at 598.
78. See, Comment, supra note 14, at 1557.
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F. The Right to Privacy
The right of privacy protects the author from an "assault upon his
own feelings." '79 The protection of the author's reputation encompasses
his work,80 but the courts have refused to allow prominent authors to
assert their right to privacy as it relates to their work." The famous
artist cannot protect his works from mutilation, alteration, or destruction
based on a right to privacy claim because he has celebrity status. Argua-
bly, a celebrity artist commands a strong contractual bargaining position,
and can therefore protect works through contract law. But given the
reluctance of courts to honor moral rights through contract law, this pro-
tection is inadequate. In addition, the advantageous bargaining position
of the famous artist may only exist after the artist has an established
reputation. Since this bargaining position exists only after a reputation
has been established, there is no power to protect the specific works
which elevate the artist to celebrity status.
Although each of the alternative legal doctrines discussed may in
some instances provide the same or similar protection as moral rights,
each is susceptible to circumstances rendering them useless. Moral
rights legislation provides necessary protection for artists against attacks
on their work.
IV
Equal Footing: Uniformity Among States, Nations,
and Professions
The enactment of the VARA creates equality among artists in differ-
ent states, nations, and professions by protecting the moral rights of art-
ists. Although these protections had existed in Europe for decades, very
few states had enacted moral rights legislation. In addition, protections
.afforded to creators of music, film, and literature had far outweighed the
protections available to visual artists.
The VARA gives artists in the U.S. protections that their European
counterparts have long enjoyed. Most European countries have upheld
moral rights for many years. For example, in 1845, the French Tribunal
Correctionnel held that a sculptor, Clesinger, had the right to institute
criminal proceedings because of the mutilation of one of his works.82
79. Id. at 1548 (citing Warren & Brandeis, supra note 45, at 193).
80. Id. at 1549 (citing William L. Prosser, Privacy, 48 CAL. L. REV. 383, 398-401 (1960)
(Prosser proposed the false light theory of privacy)).
81. Warren & Brandeis, supra note 45, at 215.
82. Roeder, supra note 8, at 555 (citing Judgment of Jan. 5, 1850, Trib. Corr. de Lyon,
Fr., D.P. 1850.3.14).
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Although the higher court refused to allow a criminal action to proceed,
it intimated that a civil action would lie. 3
Fundamental differences between European and American views of
art affect the rights granted to artists. The continental countries inter-
pret the art work as an extension of the artist's personality and therefore
inseparable from the artist.8 4 The value of the art is derived from the
intrinsic part of the artist contained in his work. 5 One case which arose
simultaneously in the United States and in France, Shostakovich v. Twen-
tieth Century Fox Films Corp.,86 and Societe Le Chant du Monde v. So-
ciete Fox Europe et Societe Fox Americaine Twentieth Century,8 7
demonstrates the difference between the views of the U.S. and many con-
tinental countries.88 In this case, a film expressing anti-Soviet political
views incorporated the music of certain Russian composers and used the
names of the composers in the credit lines. The composers sued, alleging
that they opposed the views expressed in the film and that use of their
music was tantamount to their endorsement of those views.89 The
French courts ruled that there was undoubtedly moral damage and or-
dered the film seized.' The American courts, however, ruled that there
was no invasion of privacy and therefore, no damage.91
Another example illustrates the dominance of property law in the
American legal system. Artist Alfred Crimi painted a fresco in the
Rutgers Presbyterian Church in New York City. In 1946, the church
painted over it. Crimi sued to have the new paint removed from the
fresco.9 2 The court ruled that after a work is sold an artist has no further
interest in it.9"
Works of art have been treated like any other commodity, in that
legal rights only exist with rights of ownership. The exclusion of artists'
rights from American law may have derived from English law, and spe-
cifically from the puritanical influence on the English legal system. 94 In-
deed, at least one commentator blamed the lack of English artistic talent
83. Id. (citing Judgment of Apr. 6, 1850, Cour de Paris, Fr., D.P. 1852.2.159).
84. A further discussion of the differences among European countries follows.
85. Comment, supra note 14, at 1544-45.
86. 80 N.Y.S.2d 575 (Sup. Ct. 1948), aff'd, 87 N.Y.S.2d 430 (App. Div. 1949).
87. Judgment of July 20, 1954, Cour d'appel de Paris, (D.Jur.), 16, 80 (Fr).
88. See Comment, supra note 14, at 1544-45.
89. 80 N.Y.S.2d at 576-77.
90. See William Strauss, The Moral Right of the Author, 4 AM. J. COMP. L. 506, 534 n.56.
91. 80 N.Y.S.2d at 577-78. The court did address the issue of moral rights, but refused to
apply them. Id. at 578-79.
92. Crimi v. Rutgers Presbyterian Church, 89 N.Y.S.2d 813 (Sup. Ct. 1949).
93. Id. at 815-16.
94. Rosen, supra note 36, at 180-81.
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during a period of excellence by French, German, and Dutch painters on
the English legal system.9"
The VARA also eliminates problems caused by inconsistent state
law. Prior to the passage of the VARA, several states passed their own
moral rights legislation. California and New York were the first; Louisi-
ana, Massachusetts, Maine, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island,
New Mexico, and Connecticut followed.9" However, a lack of uniform-
ity among the states made it easy to circumvent any one state's law. For
example, a work altered in one state could easily be shown in another
state. This left the creator with no way to prevent attribution of his
name to the altered work.97 The VARA, however, eliminates this prob-
lem through uniform legislation applicable to all states.98
Finally, the VARA equalizes protections available to artists of differ-
ent mediums. The fundamental difference between a painter, a sculptor,
or a lithographer and a musician, filmmaker, or a writer is production
volume. The former group produces only one copy or a limited number
of copies of the work. The latter group produces multiple exact copies.
Authors and musicians, and to some extent filmmakers, 99 collect royal-
ties based on the number of copies sold. Because painters and sculptors
rarely produce copies of their work, there is no royalty equivalent in the
limited edition visual arts world."° The copyright laws give more pro-
tection to works which are readily duplicated. The result is that
although a visual artist's original work may be more valuable than a
copy, the copies receive better protection than the original.101 By guar-
anteeing moral rights, the author's interest in the work is extended be-
yond the initial sale, thus protecting the author's interest in the original
work.
In sum, the creation of moral rights legislation in the U.S. put visual
artists in different states on equal footing. The VARA gave visual artists
the same protections accorded to authors utilizing different mediums or
residing in different nations. In addition, the VARA signifies a U.S. com-
mitment to the arts by protecting artists' rights.
95. Id. at 180.
96. Patricia Klein Lerner, Painter Goes to the Mat Over Changes in His Artwork, L.A.
TIMES, Mar. 8, 1990, at BIO (San Diego County Ed.).
97. Id.
98. Vara, supra note 1, at 5128.
99. Through the sales of video cassettes, copies of the film are sold and filmmakers receive
a royalty. See Siegel, supra note 66, at 9.
100. But see infra, notes 133-160 and accompanying text.
101. Siegel, supra note 66, at 9.
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Unresolved Issues
While the VARA accomplishes several crucial objectives, it leaves
several issues unresolved as well. First, motion pictures were expressly
exempted from the VARA.1°2 Second, the VARA avoids the copyright
doctrine of "work for hire."' 3 Third, ambiguous language included in
the VARA presents an opportunity for a governmental agency to define
"art." And finally, the VARA does not include a specific provision for
resale royalties.
A. Film Excluded from the VARA
The controversy surrounding the colorization of films highlighted
the conflict between the view of art as property and the view of art as an
extension of the author. When Ted Turner purchased a hoard of classic
films and announced his plans to colorize them for use on television, di-
vergent interests in the motion picture industry quickly drew sides. The
studios and producers, who owned the copyrights to the films, argued
that films were property and, as such, subject to the whims of the
owner. 104 The Director's Guild of America (DGA) and the Screen Ac-
tors' Guild took the opposite position and argued that since the films
were works of art, the producers had no right to alter them.1
0 5
The original version of the VARA would have protected motion pic-
tures. 10 6 Lobbying groups for both sides gathered in Washington.
Woody Allen appropriately represented the Screen Actors' Guild; many
of his films are in black and white for artistic effect. Steven Spielberg
represented the DGA.'0 7 The producers and studios emerged from this
skirmish victorious, as the VARA does not cover films.'0 8
As the Preminger case illustrates,1°9 it is difficult for a director to
guarantee that the work will not be altered, even when a written contract
stipulates that the director is to have the right to make final cuts and
edits. On the other hand, the guarantee of moral rights for filmmakers
would insure that the work was shown as the artist created it. It is unfair
102. VARA, supra note 1, at 5128.
103. Id.
104. Spielberg's Lament; Berne Convention Copyright Changes, supra note 44, at 7.
105. Id.
106. See, 133 CONG. REC. 11,502, S.1619, 100th Cong. 1st Sess. (1987). An earlier version
introduced by Sen. Kennedy applied to "pictorial, graphic or sculptural work," and would
have included films. Cf VARA, supra note 1, at 5128.
107. Spielberg's Lament; Berne Convention Copyright Changes, supra note 44, at 7.
108. VARA, supra note 1, at 5128.
109. See supra notes 75-78 and accompanying text.
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to subject the artist to criticism for work which she does not believe accu-
rately represents her.
Without moral rights protections, films may be altered without the
permission of the director. Yet, the altered work would still be attributed
to the director. The director should have the opportunity to create a
work in black and white if he chooses, without fear of a later colorization
which would ruin the intended effects. One commentator asked rhetori-
cally if the black and white Kansas scenes in "The Wizard of Oz" should
be colorized. 01o
One critical difference between films and other visual works is that
when films undergo alteration, the original may still exist. If a painting
or sculpture is altered, then the work is lost forever. However, the rea-
sons for moral rights apply just as strongly to the colorization process as
to any other alteration of an art work. In both cases, the artist is injured
because his work is displayed in a form which he did not create and his
persona is assaulted through the mutilation of the work. The reputation
of the artist may be adversely affected because the work, though altered,
may still be attributed to him.
Arguments have been raised that the viewing public should be taken
into account in areas such as the editing and colorizing of motion pic-
tures for television.III Steven Spielberg adamantly replies that, "the cre-
ation of art is not a democratic process. The public has no right to vote
on the artistic choices that go into filmmaking. The public has the right
to accept or reject the result, but not to participate in the action."' 1 2
For the moment, the MPAA has won again."I3 In a pyrrhic victory
for the directors, films were recognized as worthy artistic creations, rais-
ing the status of filmmakers to that of artists. Congress recognized cer-
tain movies as national treasures, with the original version to be kept at
the National Archives.I 4 Each year, additional films may become eligi-
ble for inclusion, thus guaranteeing that they will be displayed in their
original form." 5
110. Kernan, supra note 3, at Fl.
111. Id.
112. Id.
113. The other victory was the passage of Berne without recognizing moral rights.
114. Kathleen Silvassy, Congress Picks "Treasured" Movies, U.P.I., Sept. 20, 1989, avail-
able in LEXIS, Nexis Library, Wires File. The films were selected on the basis of importance
to American culture and history. Included among the first 25 films were "Casablanca," "Dr.
Strangelove," "High Noon," "Mr. Smith Goes to Washington," "On the Waterfront," "Snow
White and the Seven Dwarfs," and "Star Wars." Id.
115. Id.
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B. Work for Hire
The VARA also avoids the traditional copyright doctrine of works
for hire. The doctrine applies when an employee creates a copyrightable
work: the copyright vests with the employer.116 Many artists work on a
commission basis. They are not salaried, and do not receive employee
benefits, but they may be considered employees for the purpose of as-
signing the copyright. Copyright laws protect the owner, not the artist.
In effect, the artist ends up a triple loser: she has no copyright protection,
no employment benefits (such as worker's compensation and insurance),
and no contract protection." 7
The courts have attempted to mitigate the harshness of the tradi-
tional rule by injecting the concept of the independent contractor. In a
recent case involving prints by artist Patrick Nagel, the Ninth Circuit
Court of Appeals ruled that since the artist was an independent contrac-
tor, the works for hire doctrine did not apply," 8 and the copyright for
Nagel's work did not transfer to the purchaser." 9 A third party
purchased prints from Nagel's "employer" seeking to use them to make
posters. The Nagel estate sued the purchaser to enjoin the creation of the
posters on grounds that the copyright was never transferred to the "em-
ployer" because there was no employee status. 120 The Ninth Circuit held
that the copyright should remain with the estate.' 2 1
In perhaps the most publicized case involving works for hire, an
artist created a sculpture for a non-profit charity. 122 The charity organi-
zation arranged for an exhibition tour of the sculpture without the con-
sent of the artist. The artist sued, alleging that the group had exploited
his work without permission, and sought a share of the royalties. Each
party argued for sole possession of the copyrights to the work. 123 The
District of Columbia Circuit Court of Appeals held that the artist and
the charity must share in the copyright, but it did not rule on the require-
ments of a work for hire contract.124 However, the U.S. Supreme Court
overturned the appellate court's ruling. In an opinion by Justice
116. See Murray v. Gelderman, 566 F.2d 1307, 1309-10 (5th Cir. 1978) (the employer is
the statutory author of the work); Yardley v. HoughtonMifflin Co., 108 F.2d 28, 31 (2d Cir.
1939) (the employee-creator is presumed to assign the copyright).
117. See supra notes 66-78 and accompanying text.
118. Dumas v. Gommerman, 865 F.2d 1093, 1102-03 (9th Cir. 1989).
119. Id. at 1105
120. Id. at 1105.
121. Id. at 1094; see also Suzanne Muchnic, The Multibillion-Dollar Face-Off, L.A. TIMES,
Feb. 12, 1989, (Calendar), at 7.
122. Community for Creative Nonviolence v. Reid, 846 F.2d 1485 (D.C. Cir.), rev'd, 490
U.S. 730 (1988). The sculpture depicted a modem nativity scene involving a homeless family.
123. Id. at 1488 n.4.
124. Id. at 1498.
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Marshall, the Court ruled that sole ownership of the interest should be
given to the artist because the employment contract made him an in-
dependent contractor, not an employee. 125
A clearer standard of what constitutes work for hire needs to be
enunciated by Congress. Presently, the exclusion of works for hire from
the VARA provides a loophole through which artists' rights may slip.
C. Specific Language
The wording of the VARA has been criticized and should be clari-
fied. Ambiguities in the present statute allow courts to withhold protec-
tion from unpopular artists.
In order to recover, the plaintiff artist must first show that his
"honor or reputation" was injured. 126 This phrasing appears to invite
examination of the artist's personal life in order to ascertain his reputa-
tion and the extent of the harm to it. The VARA should be amended to
allow only evidence of professional reputation and honor. The damage
to the work, and not the lifestyle of the artist, should determine liability.
In addition, the work must be of "recognized stature." '127 This lan-
guage is an invitation for a governmental definition of art. 12
Foreseeably, a romantic and unrealistic classification of art would create
two categories. One type of art would be deemed worthy of admiration
and protected. On the other hand, popular art, which captures the pub-
lic's fancy only until the next fad, would not be deemed worthy of
protection. 129
Any such classification may prove dangerous and may result in the
destruction of valuable works. History shows that contemporary atti-
tudes do not determine the future significance of a work of art. Many
works now considered great were, in their time, dismissed as popular art.
For example, the Impressionist movement, which shattered the domi-
nant realist school in mid-nineteenth century Europe, was abhorred by
most critics. 130 The "Ash-Can School" artists were rejected by Ameri-
can critics. 13 1 The works of these artists survive, while the works of the
most "recognized" artists of each of those times do not. 32 Care, there-
125. 490 U.S. 730, 732 (1988).
126. VARA, supra note 1, at 5128.
127. VARA, supra note 1, at 5129.
128. Siegel, supra note 66, at 17.
129. Id. at 18.
130. Rosen, supra note 36, at 183-84.
131. Siegel, supra note 66, at 5 n.26. The Ash-Can School describes a group of American
painters who were active before the Second World War. Their works depicted immigrants in
city slums in an attempt to raise the viewer's consciousness. Rosen, supra note 36, at 184.
132. See Rosen, supra note 36, at 182-85; see also Siegel, supra note 66, at 4-9.
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fore, should be taken to avoid a standardized definition of art for the
application of the VARA.
D. Resale Royalties
Of all the provisions in the original draft of the VARA, none drew
so much fervor as the resale royalties provision. A resale royalty is a
payment made to the artist whenever the work is resold.133 This idea is
not new. California has passed a Resale Royalties Act' that has drawn
criticism from all sides. France, Germany, Italy, and at least eleven
other countries all have national resale royalties laws for visual artists. 135
The VARA only calls for the National Endowment for the Arts (NEA)
to study the feasibility and costs of such a system.' 36
In California, a Resale Royalties Act has existed for almost fifteen
years.1 37 Any art work that is sold for more than $1000 and for a gross
profit is subject to a royalty of five percent of the purchase price, paid to
the author. 3 ' This provision has been criticized because the royalty pay-
ment could exceed the profit from the resale.' 39 For example, if a work
were bought for $25,000 and sold for $26,000, the gross profit is only
$1000, but the royalty due is $1300. By adversely affecting the profit
from the resale of art, the Act discourages investment in art.
Art dealers argue that resale royalties help established and finan-
cially secure artists, but hurt those who need it most, the struggling, un-
known artist. 14° According to this view, the resale of works by known
artists generates profits for the gallery, which enable the gallery to subsi-
dize exhibits of lesser known artists. Revenue from such exhibits usually
does not cover the costs of the exhibit. In addition, the dealers have
argued that the Resale Royalties Act only affects those few artists who
are financially well off, because typically only their work sells at a
profit. 141
133. Diane B. Schulder, Art Proceeds Act: A Study of the Droit de Suite and a Proposed
Enactment for the United States, 61 Nw. U. L. REV. 19, 22 (1966-67).
134. CAL. CIV. CODE § 986 (West 1991).
135. Lynn K. Warren, Note, Droit de Suite: Only Congress Can Grant Royalty Protection
for Artists, 9 PEPP. L. REV. 111, 120 (1981).
136. VARA, supra note 1, at 5132.
137. Warren, supra note 135, at 114. The California act is codified at CAL. CIV. CODE
§ 986 (West 1991).
138. CAL. CIV. CODE § 986 (West 1991).
139. Warren, supra note 135, at 114.
140. Siegel, supra note 66, at 10-11.
141. Only .15% of all living artists have had a significant number of their works resold.
Siegel, supra note 66, at 9. This statistic is from an empirical study, which did not include
reproductions of the original works, such as posters or postcards. Id. at 9 n.44.
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The arguments of the art dealers, however, are flawed. First, the
typical royalty is small. A royalty of less than the amount of the sales tax
is not likely to affect decisions regarding exhibits to be shown. The roy-
alty is only significant when the prices are extremely high, and few gal-
leries sell extravagant works. 142
Payment of resale royalties is inherently fair. The following exam-
ple points out the dramatic inequities that can result without resale roy-
alties. In 1958, collector Richard Scull purchased a Robert
Rauschenberg painting, "Thaw," for $960. Fifteen years later, Scull re-
sold the painting for $85,000. The artist did not receive any compensa-
tion. 143 While some argue that Rauschenberg, and others like him, are
not starving artists,1" the theory behind artists' rights supports granting
resale royalty rights.
One French artist eloquently expressed this inequity: he published a
sketch of two poor children peering into the window of an extravagant
gallery. The caption read, "Look, they are selling one of Daddy's
paintings."' 145
The origin of the resale royalty concept is France's "droit de
suite."' 14 6  Other countries with some form of the "droit de suite" in-
clude Algeria, Belgium, Chile, Czechoslovakia, Germany, Italy, Luxem-
bourg, Morocco, Portugal, Tunisia, Turkey, Uruguay, and
Yugoslavia.147 The French theory regards these resale royalties as the
artist's share in the exploitation of the work, equivalent to the royalty
that a musician receives whenever his song is played. The French believe
that the creator, whether musician or artist, should share in the exploita-
tion of the work. 14' The French equivalent of the American Society of
Composers, Authors, and Publishers (ASCAP), the Societe de la
Propriete Artistique des Dessins et Models (SPADEM), monitors each
sale of art and distributes the royalty to the artist. 149
The royalty schemes in Italy and Germany rely upon a different the-
ory than the one used in France. Their rationale holds that the value of
142. Id. at 9.
143. Robert Hughes, A Modest Proposal: Royalties for Artists, TIME, Mar. 11, 1974, at 66;
Roger Ricklefs, Artists Decide They Should Share the Profits on Resale of Paintings, WALL ST.
J., Feb. 11, 1974, at 1.
144. Siegel, supra note 66, at 10-11.
145. Tad Crawford, Legislation: Art Resale Proceeds Rights, AMERICAN ARTIST, July
1979, at 82.
146. Rita E. Hauser, The French Droit de Suite: The Problem of Protection for the Under-
Privileged Artist Under the Copyright Law, 11 COPYRIGHT L. SYMP. (ASCAP) 1, 5-7 (1962).
147. Warren, supra note 135, at 120.
148. Id. at 115.
149. Id. at 119. See also Rosen, supra note 36, at 163. The French resale law allows the
artist three percent of the gross sale price if the sale is for over 10,000 francs. Id.
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the work is present when the work is created, but not realized until after
the work is resold. The apparent increase in value has nothing to do with
the buyer; the qualities which give the work value were always present,
but were unrecognized. 5 ' Germany, like France, has a royalty schedule
which is a flat percentage of the resale price.' 5 ' Italy, however, uses a
sliding scale whereby a greater increase in the resale price of a work re-
sults in a greater royalty percentage for the artist. The Italian model
adheres more closely to the theory of intrinsic value. Since the artist is
responsible for the increase in value, his benefits increase in proportion to
the increase in the resale price of the work. 52
The VARA does not provide for a resale royalty, but it does com-
mission a study to determine the feasibility of such a royalty and its effect
on the artistic community.' 53 Of the present schemes, the Italian system
is best. The French, German, and California systems, incorporating a
flat percentage of the resale price, are flawed because a royalty may ex-
ceed the profit of a resale. The French and German systems adequately
protect the artist's, interests, but the Italian system corresponds most
closely to the theory of artists' rights by rewarding greater increases in
resale price with higher royalty percentages to the artists.
The California Resale Royalties Act has come under attack on pre-
emption grounds as well. In Morseburg v. Balyon, ' the defendant art
dealer argued that the state royalties statute was preempted by the Copy-
right Act of 1976.55 The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals upheld the
trial court's ruling that the California act was not preempted by the fed-
eral act' 56 because the Copyright Act only covered the first transfer of
the work, and the resale royalty only applied to later transfers. There-
fore, the two laws did not conflict. 57
Some commentators have suggested that a contrary holding is possi-
ble under the Copyright Revision Act of 1976.158 Under section one of
150. Warren, supra note 135, at 119.
151. Id. at 118-19. German law allows a royalty of five percent when the work is resold for
more than 100 marks. Id.
152. Id. The royalty rate in Italy fluctuates between one percent and ten percent. Id. at
120.
153. VARA, supra note 1, at 5132.
154. 621 F.2d 972 (9th Cir. 1980).
155. Id. at 975.
156. Although the case was decided after the passage of the Copyright Revision of 1976,
the case arose under the Copyright Act of 1909, so it was decided under that law. Id. at 975.
The Ninth Circuit was not persuaded that the royalty was an unconstitutional taking, violated
the commerce clause, or impaired the freedom to contract. Id. at 978-79.
157. Id. at 978. See also Lewis D. Solomon & Linda V. Crill, Comment, Federal and State
Resale Royalty Legislation: "What Hath Art Wrought?," 26 UCLA L. REV. 322, 338-40
(1978).
158. Warren, supra note 135, at 116.
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the Act, 159 state laws providing rights equivalent to the federal statute
are specifically preempted. However, California case law holds other-
wise.'6 Therefore, the question remains whether there is preemption on
resale royalties. Federal legislation is required to resolve any preemption
problems which may arise.
E. Constitutional Issue
Some believe that, "A work of art is a piece of property, and you
cannot restrict what people do with their own property without running
into constitutional problems."'' This statement illustrates the mis-
guided view that has restricted the proliferation of the arts in America.
The time for the preoccupation with property rights has passed. Viewing
art as property limits a work's value to the cost of the paints and pig-
ments, the canvas and a few brushes; that is, the exogenous value of the
raw materials consumed. Such a view refuses to recognize the cultural
and aesthetic value of art.1
62
Concerns about limiting property rights amount to pernicious non-
sense when subjected to analysis. Every property interest is limited in
some way, and the inference that people can do whatever they wish with
their property is untrue. Indeed, several areas of the law provide some,
albeit incomplete, protection for the same interests protected by the
VARA. Certainly, the recognized protections of copyright and defama-
tion are permissible, and the extension of the copyright laws to include
moral rights of artists is a logical progression.
VI
Conclusion
The reasons for the creation of the VARA are complementary. By
granting moral rights, Congress recognized that works of art are funda-
mentally different from other goods produced; that the art work is a re-
flection of the artist's personality. Further, moral rights recognize that
an artist's reputation is a valuable asset and deserving of protection. Fi-
nally, in recognizing the rights of artists, Congress gives life to an explicit
purpose of the Constitution, ... To Promote the Progress of Science and
useful Arts .... 163
159. 17 U.S.C. § 301 (1988).
160. Morseburg v. Balyon, 621 F.2d 972 (9th Cir. 1980).
161. Amy Bayer, Artists'Rights Protected by New Federal Law, S.F. CHRON., Dec. 6, 1990,
at Al.
162. See Rosen, supra note 36, at 177.
163. U.S. CONST. art. I, section 8.
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